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CONTRACTING AROUND CONFLICTS IN A FAMLY
REPRESENTATION: LouIs BRANDEIS AND THE WARREN TRUST

RICHARD W. PAmNTRt

I. THE BRANDEIS CONFIRMATION HEARINGS AND THE WARREN
TRUST

Almost as much has been written about Louis Brandeis's Boston law practice as about his jurisprudence on the Supreme Court.' The phrase "lawyer for
the situation" is discussed extensively in legal literature, but these words, which
Brandeis purportedly used to describe his own style of lawyering 2 have yet to
evolve into a dearly defined standard of professional conduct. 3 Much has also
been written about the bitterly fought confirmation hearings for President Wilson's nomination of Brandeis to the Court.4
t Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. Warren Knowles Visiting Professor of Legal
Ethics, University of Wisconsin (Spring 2001). B.A. 1984, Harvard University, J.D. 1987, Yale Law School
1. Consider John P. Frank, The DgalEthicsofLouir D. Brandeis, 17 Stan L Rev 683 (1965) (point by
point rebuttal of most of the ethics allegations raised against Brandeis at his confirmation hearings); Clyde
Spillenger, Elusiwe Advoate: Reensidering Brandeis as Peopl'sLaw).er, 105 Yale L J 1445 (1996) (more critical
view of Brandeis's independent style of lawyering).
2. This phrase was attributed to Brandeis at his confirmation hearings by Boston lawyer Sherman
Whipple, a supporter of Brandeis who was trial counsel for Ned Warren in the Warren Trust matter described below. See Spillenger, 105 Yale L J at 1504 (cited in note 1) (describing misapprehension among
many commentators that Brandeis testified at his own confirmation hearings, which he did not).
3. The closest parallel in contemporary ethics rules is Model Rule 2.2 ("Intermediary"). See ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 2.2.
4. Even before the Brandeis nomination to the Court, President Wilson got a taste of what lay
ahead when Brandeis was proposed for membership in the Cosmos Club in Washington, D.C. Justice Hitz
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia wrote to President Wilson on January
30, 1915, that "Several members of the Club have started an opposition to Mr. Brandeis which bids fair to
be successful unless his friends come strongly to his support. The grounds of opposition to Mr. Brandeis
are stated to be that he is a reformer for revenue only, that he is a Jew, and that he would be a disturbing
element in any club of gentlemen." On February 1, 1915, President Wilson wrote to the Cosmos Club's
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This Article does not generally describe Brandeis's style of practicing law.
Neither does this Article address the overall merits of the accusations made
against Brandeis, other than to reiterate the obvious points that Brandeis became a lightning rod for criticism because his political ideology was perceived to
be outside the mainstream, 5 that ethnic prejudices underlay some of the opposition to Brandeis's nomination, and that his accusers in some instances alleged
conduct that they had not complained about publicly before his nomination to
the Court. The Senate Judiciary Committee heard exhaustive testimony on legal
ethics allegations against Brandeis and then confirmed his nomination in a vote
6
almost strictly along party lines.
Instead of addressing all of the allegations raised in the hearings, this Artide
focuses on one specific transaction in which Brandeis's legal ethics were criticized-the matter of the Warren Trust. The Warren Trust involved a large paper manufacturing business owned by the family of Brandeis's law school classmate, co-author, and law partner, Samuel Dennis Warren, Jr. The Warren family's bitter dispute over this business, and other matters, ended tragically with a
lawsuit and then, shortly afterwards, Sam Warren's suicide in 1910. Although
these events had deep-seated causes within the Warren family itself, the tragedy
was to be publicly blamed on the Warrens' lawyer, Louis Brandeis, in his 1916
confirmation hearings for the Supreme Court.
The Warren Trust is worth studying-and including in a legal ethics casebook 7 -for several reasons. First, the discussion of this episode at the hearings
shows that conflicts typically arising in representation of family businesses have
changed relatively little in the past one hundred years, and that professional responsibility standards applied to these conflicts have changed relatively little as
well. Almost all of the witnesses at the 1916 hearing were sensitive to conflicts
that arise when a single lawyer represents an entire family, yet most of the witnesses were cognizant of the difficulty, and often practical impossibility, of insisting on separate representation for individual family members. Moorfield
Storey (counsel for Sam's brother Fiske Warren in the 1910 Warren family lawadmissions committee, saying that he held Brandeis in "highest esteem" and that "his admission to the
Club would not only be an act of justice to him, but would add a member of very fine quality to its list."
Brandeis eventually was elected to the Club. See Alpheus Thomas Mason, Brandeis: A Free Man's Life 466-67
(1956). For discussion of anti-Semitism as it affected Brandeis's life and professional career, see A. Gal,
Brandeisof Boston (1980); T. Karfunkel and T. Ryley, The Jewisb Seat: Anti-Semitism and the Appointment ofJews to
the Supreme Court(1978).
5. See generally Paul A. Freund, Appointment ofJustices: Some HistoricalPerspectives, 101 Harv L Rev
1146 (1988) (describing political motivation behind attacks on Brandeis, including resentment of Brandeis's
opposition to large financial and railroad interests).
6. Idat 1152.
7. See John T. Noonan, Jr. and Richard W. Painter, ProfessionalandPersonalResponsibilitiesof the Lawyer 386-422 (Foundation 2d ed 2001). The matter of the Warren Trust was briefly discussed by Judge
Noonan in a published lecture in 1981. See John T. Noonan,Jr., Other Peoples Morals: The Lawyer's Conscience,
48 Tenn L Rev 227 (1981) (distinguished alumni lecture). This lecture focused for the most part on the role
of Ned Warren's counsel in cross-examining Sam Warren in the 1910 trial.
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suit) testified that it was a "common practice" for a lawyer to represent an entire
family in connection with a trust or business, despite potential conflicts of interest,8 and Storey's description of prevailing practice would be accurate today.
Although a lawyer today might memorialize in writing family members' consent
to common representation and their recognition of the risks involved, the dilemma and the way in which that dilemma is resolved in many cases-in favor
of common representation-is basically the same.
The Warren Trust is also interesting because the testimony about the matter
by Brandeis's opponents before the Senate Judiciary Committee shows how
preconceived notions about a lawyer's character and the character of his clients
interfere with objective evaluation of the lawyer's ethics. 'Eyewitness" accounts
were shaped by exaggeration of Brandeis's role in Sam Warren's management of
the trust property after the Trust was set up in 1889, naive idealization of relations within the Warren family before the dispute over the Trust erupted, and
prejudicial assumptions about Brandeis's character and approach to business
transactions. Brandeis's supporters challenged his opponents' account of what
happened, but without confronting the prejudicial assumptions that underlay his
opponents' version of events.
Most important, nobody in the hearing room appears to have really understood the transaction that lay at the heart of the Warren Trust matter-a family
decision about what to do with the family's business after the death of its founder, Sam Warren's father Samuel D. Warren, Sr. Only one of Samuel D. Warren,
Sr.'s five children, Sam, had any sustained interest in operating this business, but
all of his children expected it to provide them with an independent income. A
problem which probably would be addressed today by setting up a close corporation, or perhaps a limited liability company ("LLC"), was left unresolved when
Samuel D. Warren, Sr., died, with instructions in his will that a way be found for
the family to operate the business or that it be sold. For the business to stay in
the family, control and appropriate compensation had to be given to family
members who wanted to operate the business and had the ability to do so, principally Sam and a cousin who had worked with Sam's father in the business for
years, Mortimer Mason.
Far from helping Sam cheat his less industrious siblings, Brandeis may have
devised an arrangement that saved the business from the auction block (although in retrospect the Warren family might have been happier had the business been sold). Brandeis did so by starting with the most prevalent organizational form of the day, the dynastic trust, and then contracting around its fiduciary rules so the business could be effectively managed by Sam and Mortimer
Mason. It turned out that Brandeis may not have effectively contracted around
8. See Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 64th
Cong, 1st Sess 279 (1916) ("Hearings).
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fiduciary rules governing dynastic trusts, either because he erroneously thought
immutable rules could be treated as default rules or (more likely) because he and
Sam thought nobody in the family would sue. The terms of the contract devised
by Brandeis, however, should have been apparent to all of the Warrens, and the
duplicity that he was accused of at his confirmation hearings was not supported
by the facts.
Unfortunately for the Warrens, deep-seated familial conflict could not be alleviated by wealth. Indeed money became a catalyst for exacerbating conflict.
Decades after the Trust was formed, it was plagued by interpersonal conflict as
well as by the same legal problems that today underlie disputes over close corporations-accusations of control person opportunism coupled with minority
desire for an exit not provided for by the organizational form's legal rules. Unfortunately for Brandeis, when he was nominated to the Court in 1916, in the
eyes of many it was not the Warrens themselves but Brandeis who was to blame.
Brandeis was not present at his confirmation hearings to explain what really
happened and the principal protagonist in this episode, Sam, had killed himself
six years earlier.
THE WARREN FAMILY
Samuel Dennis Warren, Sr., was a first generation capitalist of New England
ancestry who dedicated his life to building his family business (a large paper
manufacturing facility in Maine with a sales branch, known as S.D. Warren &
Co., in Boston). Warren was also determined to achieve for his family a leading
role in Boston society. His wife Susan Clarke Warren, a minister's daughter,
became a prominent socialite and voracious collector of art and antiques, and
his four male children (Sam, Henry, Ned and Fiske) all attended Harvard College. His daughter Cornelia was encouraged to become an ambitious collector of
art and a civic leader in Boston. 9
The Warren children had more than sufficient wealth to support themselves
and to make substantial civic and cultural contributions to Boston. As they grew
older, they each took advantage of financial freedom to go their separate ways.
Sam, the oldest son, adhered most closely to his father's path. After graduating
from Harvard College (were he was a member of the Porcellian Club) and Harvard Law School (where he graduated second in his class behind Louis
Brandeis), he practiced law with Brandeis for over a decade until his father's
death in 1888. Sam then took over control of the family paper business that he
administered through a trust designed in large part by Brandeis (described more

9. See Martin Green, The Mount Vernon Street Warrens: A Boston Stoy, 1860-1910 13-35 (Scribner's
1989) (describing the early years of Samuel D. Warren, Sr., and the founding of his paper business); id at
36-52 (describing the birth and childhoods of the Warren children); id at 53-76 (describing the teen and
college years of the Warren children).
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completely below). Sam also became a leader in Boston society, marrying the
daughter of a prominent senator from Delaware and eventually becoming a
trustee of the Museum of Fine Arts ("MFA"), where he led the construction of

the MFA's current building on Huntington Avenue.1 0
The other sons, however, did not follow the examples of their father and
older brother. Henry, hunchbacked and severely disabled since childhood, never

married and spent much of his relatively short life (he died at age forty-six in
1899) pursuing the study of Sanskrit and the Buddhist religion at a house he
built for himself on Quincy Street near Harvard Yard (now known as Warren
House and for many years the home of the Harvard English Department).
Henry had very little interest in business affairs. 1
Fiske had a passing interest in the family business, enough so that he became a minor partner in the firm that was to operate the paper mills after his
father's death. His true passion, however, was leftist politics, and in particular
the anti-imperialist cause that swept Boston when President McKinley, and then
President Theodore Roosevelt, embarked on foreign adventures to catch up
with the imperial ambitions of the European powers. 12 As Fiske traveled to the
Philippines and elsewhere around the world, he frequently appeared on the front
page of Boston newspapers accused of treason against his country and was increasingly a source of embarrassment for the Warrens. 13 Fiske also used his
share of the family wealth to start experimental communities in various suburbs
of Boston, all of which were based on socialist principles and which at times
embraced other causes, including nudism. As Fiske turned toward these pursuits, and away from the family business, his share in the firm that operated the
paper mills was steadily reduced by the controlling partner, his brother Sam. 14
Ned Warren's passion was the art and culture of ancient Greece. Ned had
much to resent about Boston, whose still-Puritanical moral code condemned his
homosexuality. Ned's sexual preferences were integrated with his love of classical culture, which he believed promoted a "masculinity" superior to the philistine culture of bourgeois Boston. Ned's passions for art and romance led him,
upon graduating from Harvard, first to Oxford (which he found culturally and
intellectually superior to a "vulgar" Harvard), then to Paris and Italy where he
began his lifelong pursuit of collecting antiquities, and finally to buy an estate in
southern England (Lewes House) where his acquisitions could be displayed and
where he and select gentlemen friends could live and pursue their study of classical Greece. Ned's art acquisitions gradually increased in number and expense,
10.
successful
in 1883).
11.
12.
13.
14.

See id at 62 (describing Sam's life as an undergraduate at Harvard); id at 100-07 (describing the
law practice of Warren and Brandeis in the 1880s and Sam Warren's marriage to Mabel Bayard
See id at 67-68, 77-81.
See id at 153-58.
Seeid at 155-57.
See id at 6.
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and he enlisted the help of art experts, most notably Bernard Berenson, to assist
15
him in amassing a collection of impressive dimensions.
As Ned got older, he embarked on a crusade to bring the values of classical
Greece, including the classical view of masculinity, back to his native Boston.
His vehicle for accomplishing this was art-the many statues and other antiquities that he would buy in Europe and then either donate or sell back to the
MFA. Although Ned was responsible for much of the MFA's current antiquities
collection, his ambitions for even greater glory were frustrated by two other
powerful figures in Boston's art world, both of whom had the "home court"
advantage of being present there most of the year: Isabella Stewart Gardner who
was building her own collection at Fenway Court and Ned's older brother Sam
who looked with disdain on Ned's lifestyle and on Ned's "waste" of money on
antiquities. Sam, as a trustee of the MFA, also was raising money for the museum's new building and worried that further expenditure on the museum's
collection would detract from this effort. Sam thus controlled not only the family finances, in effect doling out an "allowance" to Ned from the profits of the
paper mills, but was controlling what Ned could do in the Boston art world as
well. Ned, who had dedicated his life to art, resented this interference bitterly,
and one consequence was that Ned began to question Sam's conduct in his own
16
sphere of influence, the family business.
Cornelia inherited her mother's interest in collecting art and antiques, but
also had an active interest in the promotion of settlement houses and other social work. She was also a strong supporter of women's education at Wellesley
College and elsewhere around Boston. 17 Although she never married, Cornelia
was an active participant in family life. She was probably her mother's closest
confidant and later was an intermediary in disputes between Ned and Sam, and
sometimes between Fiske and Sam. Her practicality and concern for the needs
of the less fortunate, however, made it difficult for her to identify with Ned's
romantic ambitions or to sympathize with his steadily increasing expenditure of
money both on antiquities and on "stipends" for young male protg&s enlisted
to help him in the study of antiquity. 18

15. See id at 72-76 (describing Ned's undergraduate years at Harvard); id at 85-89 (describing Ned's
romantic pursuits and involvement with the aesthetic movement at Oxford); id at 112-23 (describing the
daily routine of Ned and his young prot~g~s at Lewes House in Sussex, England).
16. See id at 132-36 (describing competition between Ned and Mrs. Gardner in acquiring art and
Sam's involvement with the MFA as a trustee); id at 161-62 (describing Ned's resentment of Sam's interference with his collecting and of Sam's control over the Mills Trust).
17. See id at 107-11 (describing Cornelia's early involvement with Wellesley College and with the
founding of settlement houses in Boston's South End); id at 136-43, 189-91 (describing Cornelia's continued work with, and financial support for, the settlement house movement in Boston).
18. See id at 190-91 (distinguishing Cornelia's reformist outlook from the aesthetic movement embraced by Ned). Cornelia, unlike Sam, however, remained on friendly terms with Ned until Ned filed his
lawsuit against Sam. See id at 211 (discussing Cornelia cutting Ned out of her will because of her anger at
Ned over his lawsuit against Sam).
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Louis BRANDEIS

Brandeis was a newcomer to Boston. Born in Louisville, Kentucky, to parents who emigrated from Prague, he did not receive a formal college education.
Largely self taught, he enrolled in Sam Warren's class at Harvard Law School at
age eighteen and graduated first in his class. 19 Through his law partnership with
Warren, he successfully integrated himself into Boston's legal and social estab21
lishment,20 and was listed in the 1891 edition of the Boston Social Register.
Although of Jewish descent, Brandeis did not embrace Judaism until 1905 nor
the Zionist cause until 1912. 22
With an increase of anti-Semitism in the early 1900s, Brandeis's shift to the
left politically and his move to Washington to take on high profile cases,
Brandeis later found much of the Boston bar aligned against him in 1916.23 In
the 1880s and early 1890s, however, he focused primarily on representing private clients in Boston. When Samuel D. Warren, Sr., died in 1888, Brandeis was
called upon to assist his law partner Sam in designing a structure for keeping the
Warrens' business within the family.

THE TRUST
Samuel D. Warren, Sr., ran S.D. Warren & Co. in two parts: the paper mills
and real estate in Maine (collectively, the "Mills Property"), which he had bought
in the 1850s with partners whom he eventually bought out, and a firm (S.D.
Warren & Co.) that operated the Mills Property as well as a paper selling office
in Boston. Samuel D. Warren, Sr., was the principal partner in S.D. Warren &
Co., with various other Boston businessmen going in and out of the partnership.
His cousin Mortimer Mason was the principal operating officer of, and a partner
in, S.D. Warren & Co. (but had no title in the Mills Property).24 Samuel D. Warren, Sr.'s son Sam and Brandeis, practicing law as Warren and Brandeis, provided legal services to S.D. Warren & Co.25
19.

Id at 63-67 (describing Brandeis's early years and close relationship with the Warren family).

20. Id at 100-07 (describing the successful law practice of Warren and Brandeis in the 1880s and
Sam Warren and Brandeis's publication of their right to privacy article in the Harvard Law Review in 1890).

21.

Id at 102.

22.
23.

Idat 191.
See id at 208-09; Freund, 101 Harv L Rev at 1151-52 (cited in note 5).

24. See Green, Mount Vernon Street Warrensat 23-25 (cited in note 9) (describing Mr. Warren's purchase of a paper mill at Westbrook in Cumberland County, Maine, and the early years of S.D. Warren &
Co.); id at 26-35 (describing growth of the business into a large paper manufacturing concern). See also
Headngs at 137-59 (cited in note 8) (testimony of Hollis Bailey, counsel for Ned in his 1910 lawsuit, who
opposed Brandeis's nomination to the Court); id at 263-81 (testimony of Moorfield Storey, counsel for
Fiske in the same suit and a severe critic of Brandeis in general who probably opposed his nomination to
the Court).
25. Hearingsat 682-706 (cited in note 8) (testimony of Edward McClennen, Brandeis's law partner in
1910, counsel for Sam in Ned's 1910 lawsuit, and a supporter of Brandeis's nomination to the Court,
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When Samuel D. Warren, Sr., died in 1888, he left the family houses in Boston to his wife, various sums of money to his brothers and sisters, and one third
of the remainder of his estate to Mrs. Warren and two thirds to be divided up
among his five children. The bulk of his estate was the Mills Property, which at
the time his will was written in 1882 he did not know what to do with because
none of his children seemed to be interested in working for S.D. Warren & Co.
Sam, the only one who might be interested, was enjoying a successful law practice with Brandeis. The will provided that the business was to be run by the executors appointed by the will for eighteen months, after which they would consult the family and decide what to do with it (the will suggested that they might
want to sell it). The executors, who would have the final authority to decide
what to do with the Mills Property on behalf of the beneficiaries, were Sam,
26
Mortimer Mason, and Mrs. Warren.
By the time of Samuel D. Warren, Sr.'s death, he had persuaded Sam to
gradually phase out his law practice and work for S.D. Warren & Co. instead,
and even Fiske was working for the business in a junior capacity.2 7 The decision
was thus made in 1889 that the Mills Property would stay in the family and be
operated by Sam, Fiske, and Mortimer Mason. It is not known what was said to
each family member when they were consulted about this decision, but all did
consent. Mrs. Warren and all five children signed documents (probably drafted
by Brandeis) conveying their interest in the Mills Property over to a dynastic
trust (the "Trust") for a period of thirty-three years. The trustees were to be the
executors Mr. Warren had appointed in his will: Sam, Mortimer Mason, and
Mrs. Warren. It was also understood at the time the Mills Property was conveyed to the Trust that the Trust would in turn lease the Mills Property to a firm
also to be called S.D. Warren & Co. (the "Firm'), that the Firm would operate
the manufacturing facility and share the profits therefrom with the Trust, and
28
that the principals of the Firm would be Sam, Fiske, and Mortimer Mason.
Brandeis was to act as counsel in the transaction for both the Trust and the
Firm. For reasons explained below, Brandeis was also a conduit through which
the lease was accomplished; the Mills Property was leased first to Brandeis and
then by him to the Firm.29
The lease from the Trust through Brandeis to the Firm (the "Lease") was
discussing Warren and Brandeis's role as counsel for S.D. Warren & Co. and as counsel for the executors).
26. Green, Mount Vernon Street Warrensat 81-83 (cited in note 9) (describing Mr. Warren's death and
the provisions of his will). See also Hearings at 277-79 (cited in note 8) (testimony of Moorfield Storey
discussing the same).
27. Green, Mount Vernon Street Warrens at 83 (cited in note 9).
28. Id at 83-85 (describing establishment of the Mills Trust). See also Hearings at 138-51 (cited in
note 8) (testimony of Hollis Bailey); id at 277-79 (testimony of Moorfield Storey).
29. See Hearings at 140 (cited in note 8) (testimony of Hollis Bailey) ("the three trustees-Samuel D.
Warren, Mr. Mason, and Mrs. Warren, Sr.-made a lease of the property to Mr. Brandeis, as a conduit, and
through him or from him, to Mr. Warren individually, to Mr. Mason individually, and to Mr. Fiske Warren
a small fractional interest.").
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drafted by Sam or Brandeis and provided that the Firm would pay rent equal to
6 percent of the book value of the Mills Property (valued at approximately $2
million at the time) plus one half of the profits of the Firm (the business had
earned $460,000, or a return of nearly 25 percent, in 1888, but future earnings
were of course uncertain).30 The Firm could back out of the Lease at any time,

but the Trust had to give several years notice prior to terminating the Lease. In
essence, this meant that if the Mills were operating less profitably than expected,
the Firm could approach the trustees to renegotiate the rent. If the business
were unexpectedly profitable, on the other hand, the Firm would be guaranteed
enjoyment of its share of the profits for several years before the trustees could
ask to renegotiate. The partners of the Firm were also authorized to make improvements at the Mills of an amount up to one third of the net income of the
Firm, an amount that was to be charged to the Trust (repairs were charged to
the Firm). 31 Monies paid over to the Trust were to be distributed in the same
proportion as Samuel D. Warren, Sr., had disposed of his property in his will:
32
five fifteenths to Mrs. Warren and two fifteenths to each of his five children.
The arrangement thus perpetuated the two-tiered structure used by Sam
Warren, Sr.-his sole ownership of the Mills Property (which had now been
conveyed to the Trust) and the operation of the Mills Property by the Firm
(which now consisted of Sam, Mortimer Mason, and Fiske) 3 3 Sam's authority
30. Hearingsat 466 (cited in note 8) (testimony of William Youngman concerning the value of the
Mills Property and 1888 earnings).
31. Green, Mount Vernon Street Warrens at 83 (cited in note 9). See also Hearingsat 140 (cited in note
8) (testimony of Hollis Bailey stating that the Lease specified a rent "of 6 percent interest on the real estate
leased to the firm, and half of the net profits of the firm, and it also provided that the lessees should make
repairs and replacements, and the lessors, the trustees, should make additions.'); id at 283 (testimony of
Sherman Whipple, trial counsel for Ned in his 1910 lawsuit and supporter of Brandeis's nomination, stating
that the Lease "provided that the lessees might, upon giving a very short notice--comparatively short
notice-terminate the lease, and thus the responsibility which they had assumed and the lease would be
brought to an end, while, as I remember, the lessors were bound for quite a long term of years, which had
the effect of permitting the lessees on short notice, if things were going against them, to terminate the lease
and turn the property back so that its further operation or disposition would be upon the trust; that is, the
trustees.').

32. Green, Mount Vernon Street Warrens at 83 (cited in note 9). See also Hearings at 138-51 (cited in
note 8) (testimony of Hollis Bailey describing the Trust arrangement).
33. The similarity of the Trust to Samuel D. Warren's prior arrangement was discussed by Moorfield Storey at Brandeis's confirmation hearings:
SENATOR FLETCHER. There is no criticism to make of the execution of the leases by these
trustees, in which some of the trustees were lessees?
MR. STOREY. That seemed to be inevitable. The partner in the firm had been the owner of the
property. On his death the property descended, under the will, to his heirs. They became the
owners. It was important that the relation between the property and the selling agency should
continue. It was inevitable that the arrangement should be made. From the very nature of the
case, it was impossible for them [not] to be on both sides of the contract. The only question
was whether the contract was fair, and was carried out. The contract was submitted to all parties
and they agreed to it
SENATOR FLETCHER. I understand the deed of trust contained a provision which authorized the trustees to lease and sell.
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over the Mills Property could be checked only by the two other trustees, his
mother and Mortimer Mason, neither of whom were likely to challenge his decisions. Indeed Mrs. Warren may have been appointed a trustee only after one of
the beneficiaries, Henry, asked that there be a trustee not connected with the
Firm.34 The Trust's beneficiaries also knew that two of the three trustees, Sam
and Mortimer Mason, would be operating the business and controlling the Firm,
with Fiske being their junior partner (Fiske's minor share in the Firm was steadily diminished in subsequent years as Fiske took less and less interest in the
business).35 Although the other family members might not have understood all
of the legal details, the fundamentals of this arrangement, in particular the assumption of control over the family business by Sam and Mortimer Mason,

MR. STOREY. The purpose was to reestablish the same relations that existed between Mr.
Warren, while he was alive, and his firm, as between his heirs and the new firm.... And of
course Mr. Warren, in his life, was on both sides of that contract, and all that could be done was
to make a faircontract. The contract was drawn and submitted to all parties. As I say, I saw
nothing in it to criticize.
Hearingsat 279 (cited in note 8).
34. "On May 4, 1889, four weeks before the papers were executed, there was a written letter which
Sam Warren wrote to Henry, as follows:
Boston, May 4, 1889
My Dear Henry:
I enclose you a copy of the original draft of the trust agreement and of an amended draft
thereof. The latter is the result of my cogitations since I talked with you and, I believe, isan improvement on the old in one or two particulars.
First. It meets your point regarding a trustee not connected with the business.
Second. It provides for a reserve of income independent of improvements at the mills. Since
you preferred not to have a general power of reinvestment for a specified fraction of the income, I think it necessary for the protection of the trust property, to have at least the power to
reserve as a guaranty against future needs. The trustees, in other words, ought [sic] not to be
called upon to pay out every cent of income at the end of each year, not expended for improvements, no matter what the needs or prospects of the coming or future year might be. This
reserve would also make it possible to supply any deficiency of income below the normal expenditures of the beneficiaries in a bad year, making it up in a good.
Third. In order to meet a possible legal objection to an absolute period of 23 years for the duration of the trust, I have inserted the first limitation that it shall not endure beyond the life of the
survivors of the residuary legatees. The death of such survivor will not, I trust, take place within
23 years.
The above, I believe, are the principal changes, although I have altered it in some other details.
The total result is the product of some thought, and I desire to have it copied and put in final
form as soon as may be. Please show to mother and Pussy.
Your affec.
Sam.
Henry C. Warren, Esq.
... 'Pussy' meant Miss Corneia Warren." Id at 858 (Testimony of Edward McClennen). The duration of
the Trust was in fact thirty-three years. Either Sam erred in this letter in referring to "an absolute period of
23 years," or the letter was not properly typed into the hearing transcript.
35. Fiske was originally to receive 16 2/3 percent of the Firm's profits, Sam 33 1/3 percent, and
Mortimer Mason 50 percent. In 1896, this distribution was changed to Fiske 10 percent and Sam 40 percent, and then changed again in 1902 to Fiske 5 percent and Sam 45 percent, and finally in 1902 to Fiske 2
1/2 percent and Sam 47 1/2 percent. Green, Mount Vernon Street
Warrensat 5-6 (cited in note 9).
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should have been apparent to everyone.
Deciding on this approach instead of selling the Mills Property was to have
serious, and ultimately tragic, consequences for the Warren family. First, the
arrangement separated ownership of the business from control, giving the owners of the business (the beneficiaries of the Trust) almost no say over how it was
run or how much of the profits paid to the Trust would be distributed to them
in cash as opposed to being reinvested in the Mills Property as capital improvements. Ned, and sometimes Fiske, resented their older brother Sam's control
over their financial lives. The principals of the Firm also were compensated for
their services by receiving half of the Firm's profits in excess of 6 percent of the
principal (the book value of the Mills Property), meaning that if the business did
well they could make an enormous amount of money. Furthermore, the Firm's
principals controlled its accounts and, by manipulating various factors such as
the amounts spent on capital improvements (chargeable to the Trust) as opposed to repairs (chargeable to the Firm), could increase the Firm's profits. Finally, and probably most important, there was no exit option for the Trust beneficiaries. They had committed themselves to this arrangement for thirty-three
years.
II. Tim CLOSE CoRPORATION ANALOGY
The Warren Trust coupled with the Lease accomplished much the same
thing as what today would probably be accomplished by using a closely held
corporation, or perhaps an LLC. In some respects the arrangement was similar
to a close corporation, but in other ways it was quite different.
No Exit. As is true for shareholders in a closely held corporation, the beneficiaries of the Warren Trust had no exit from the arrangement and thus no
access to their capital, unless the majority of the trustees wanted to give it to
them by distributing assets from the Trust. In a dose corporation, a judicially
provided exit--dissolution-is generally only available upon a showing of oppression.3 6 Similarly, the Trust beneficiaries could only exit without the trustees'
consent if the beneficiaries went to court and alleged breach of trust by the trustees. A lawsuit was thus the only way to force either dissolution of the Trust or a
settlement that would allow the beneficiaries access to their capital. (When Ned
did sue in 1910, he settled for a cash buyout of his interest in the Trust.)
Governance. If a close corporation is an oligarchy (of the majority shareholders), a dynastic trust is an autocracy (the trustees have near absolute power).
Whereas close corporation default rules provide any coalition of majority shareholders authority to control the entity, a trust divorces ownership from control
36.

See generally In

Kemp &Bealy, 64 NY 2d 63, 473 NE2d 1173 (1984) (discussing the evolu-

don of the legal doctrine of oppression in a dose corporation and the various tests used to determine if
there has been majority oppression of minority shareholders sufficient to warrant dissolution).
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and gives the beneficiaries no governance role. This is usually, however, exactly
what a trust settlor intends. In some situations, the descendants of a business
founder are incapable or uninterested in exercising even general oversight functions, requiring that most of them be excluded from control. Allowing every
descendant a governance role would expose the business to the whim of a single
generation of heirs who could sell out too cheaply or maximize short-term cash
flow at the expense of long-run goals (even a small shareholder in a close corporation can accomplish such objectives by forming alliances with other shareholders). The legal rules of a dynastic trust address this problem by giving absolute power to the trustee, whereas the close corporation can only divorce control
from majority ownership if tailor-made rules are included in the articles of incorporation, for example, by distinguishing between voting and nonvoting
stock.
Nixon v Blackwel, 37 a recent Delaware close corporation case, illustrates how
close corporation default rules can be contracted around to create a governance
arrangement remarkably similar to the Warren Trust. In Nixon, a close corporation with two classes of stock was used to deal with the active/passive investor
dichotomy in a family closely held business; voting class A stock was given to
the managers, most of whom were from outside the family, and nonvoting class
B stock was given to family members who were passive investors. The family
patriarch set up this arrangement to give the managers control over the company and an incentive to run it efficiently, while at the same time providing income to his heirs. As in the case of the Warren Trust, the family members who
were passive investors complained when the managers used their control to
enrich themselves, in this case by giving themselves liquidity through share re38
purchase agreements.
FiduciagDuo Norms and Conflicts of Interest. In Nixon, the complaining family
members lost in court, which underscores the vastly different fiduciary duty
norms that govern a close corporation on the one hand and a dynastic trust on
the other. While the Nixon court purported to apply a fairness analysis to the
managers' share repurchase agreements, the court really only inquired into
whether the share repurchases had a legitimate business purpose, and found that
they did. The court observed that the family patriarch had chosen to take control away from his heirs for a reason and had also chosen to organize the business as a corporation, an organizational form in which courts have historically
deferred to directors' decisions. 39 As in many jurisdictions, there was substantial
deference in Nixon to the corporation's control persons under the so-called
"business judgment rule. '40 This in part reflects a recent trend toward increased
37.
38.
39.
40.
standards

626 A2d 1366 (Del 1993).
See id at 1371-73.
Id at 1379.
The law governing fiduciary duties in close corporations in Massachusetts is stricter than the
articulated in Nixon. See Donahue v Rodd Eletrotpe, 328 NE2d 505 (Mass 1975). As pointed out
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tolerance of interested director transactions (particularly insofar as many modem courts even bypass scrutinizing a transaction for fairness to the corporation
41
if the transaction is approved of by disinterested directors or shareholders).
Even in Brandeis's time, however, courts in Massachusetts and other states recognized that directors sometimes transact with their corporations out of necessity (often by advancing loans to a corporation in financial difficulties), and that
it would be counterproductive to invalidate a transaction that was open and fair
to the corporation. 42
There were similar transactions with control persons in the Warren Trust.
Just as some directors work for a dose corporation on a day-to-day basis and are
compensated for doing so, two of the three trustees of the Warren Trust (Sam
and Mortimer Mason) were principals in the Firm, meaning there was substantial overlap between the Trust's governing body and the persons paid to manage
the Trust's property. The problem, of course, was that the Warren Trust was not
a corporation.
Prohibitions on conflicts of interest in a trust are a lot more onerous. First,
trustees are prohibited from self-dealing in the trust property.43 While the Warren Trust perhaps technically avoided this prohibition by leasing the Mills Property first to Brandeis as a conduit and then by him to the Firm,44 the Lease was
below, even in Massachusetts, fiduciary standards under corporate law are not as strict as under the law of
trusts (see text accompanying notes 43-49).
41. See Del Gen Corp Law § 144.
42. See Sallmarsb vSpauldin& 147 Mass 224, 230 (1888) (upholding sale of a corporation's mortgaged
property to one of its directors to pay off a loan to the corporation: "A director of a corporation is not
prohibited from lending it moneys when they are needed for its benefit, and when the transaction is open,
and otherwise free from blame; nor is his subsequent purchase of its property at a fair public sale by a
trustee under a deed of trust, executed to secure a payment of the debt, invalid."). See also Holt v Bennett,
146 Mass 437, 439 (1888) ('There was no reason why this corporation should not conduct its business in
the ordinary manner, even if incidentally debts for borrowed money were paid to its directors, this being
done fairly and in its prosecution of the object for which it was formed.").
43. Consider Haoes vHall, 188 Mass 510, 511, 74 NE 935, 936 (1905) (holding that sale of trust
property to a trustee is only permitted under court decree after notice to the trust beneficiaries and a hearing). Brandeis's law partner Edward F. McClennen was certainly aware at the time of Ned Warren's suit
that it would be very difficult substantively to defend an arrangement in which a third party conduit was
used to avoid this principle of trust law. The Hoyes ruling was based upon a report that McClennen had
himself submitted as a court-appointed special master, and in which he had found breach of trust by a
trustee who arranged for a third party to bid at a public sale for trust property that was then conveyed to
the trustee's wife. See id at 510-11.
44. The arrangement probably was intended to comply with statutory prohibitions on self-dealing
by trustees by at least technically avoiding a transaction directly between the Trust and the Firm. Massachusetts statutes required a trustee to disgorge to the trust any profit derived by him from his use of trust
property or occupancy of the real estate owned by the trust. See Public Statutes of Massachusetts ch 144, §
4 (1886) (enacted November 19, 1881, to take effect February 1, 1882) ("Every executor, administrator,
guardian, and trustee shall be chargeable in his account with all the personal estate of the deceased which
comes to his hands and which is by law to be administered, although not included in the inventory; also
with all proceeds of real estate sold or mortgaged, and with all interest, profit, and income that come to his
hands from the personal estate of the deceased.'); id at § 5 ("If the real estate has been used or occupied by
an executor or administrator, he shall account for the income thereof as ordered by the probate court with
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clearly vulnerable to legal challenge by one of the Trust beneficiaries. 45 Second,
the law of trusts requires forfeiture at the option of trust beneficiaries of all
gains earned by trustees from the trust property. 46 "The trustee who deals with
trust property for the trustee's own account is liable to disgorge the profits to
the trust even if the trustee paid fair value for the property." 47 It does not matter
48
whether the trust was harmed, or even benefited, from the trustee's actions.
Any profit derived by Sam and Mortimer Mason from their operation of the
Mills Property could thus be forfeited to the Trust. Although Brandeis had
opined that the Lease was legal under the Massachusetts law of trusts, alleged
self-dealing by Sam or the other trustees in carrying out the terms of the Lease
(or enforcing those terms on behalf of the Trust) would be subject to close judicial scrutiny if any of the beneficiaries were to sue. There would be no "business
judgment rule"-or even a "fairness test"--standing between Sam and his siblings if any of them were to cry foul and Sam could not prove that all of the
49
beneficiaries had assented after full disclosure to everything he had done.

the assent of the executor or administrator and of such other parties interested as are present at the rendering of the account. If the parties do not agree on the sum to be allowed, it shall be determined by three
disinterested persons to be appointed by the probate court, whose award, when accepted by the court, shall
be finl.'). Sam and Mortimer Mason probably could technically comply with these statutes without accounting for the Firm's profits because as a formal matter the Trust had leased the property to Brandeis
and the Firm was occupying the Mills Property as Brandeis's sublessee, not as a lessee of the Trust. This
does not mean, however, that the two trustees would not later have to account for the Firm's profits if the
arrangement were challenged by one of the Trust beneficiaries.
45. See Hayes, 188 Mass at 511 ("The rule that a trustee in the management of property held by him
in trust shall not be permitted directly or indirectly to derive any personal advantage from its use or sale,
but must act solely for the interests of those beneficially interested, has often been referred to, and approved by this court.'). See also Arnold v Brown, 41 Mass (24 Pick) 89, 96 (1832) ("the trustee has no right
to derive any benefit or advantage from the trust fund; but all his skill and labor in the management of it
must be directed to the advancement of the interest of his cestuique lmst.").
46. See Arnold, 41 Mass at 97 ("Nor can this salutary rule be evaded by circuity of conveyances. As
the trustee cannot sell directly to himself, so he cannot do the same thing indirectly, by selling to another
person for his benefit. As he is bound to act in every thing pertaining to the trust, for the advantage of the
cestui que trust, so the latter always has the option to consider the sale valid or invalid as he shall deem most
for his interest. When he is capable of acting, his assent will give vitality to a contract which before only
had a potential existence.'). A trustee's use of a third party conduit, as was done in the case of the Mills
Trust, is thus unlikely to prevent a trust beneficiary from successfully suing to void the transaction unless
all of the trust beneficiaries assent to the transaction.
47. John H. Langbein, The ContractadanBasis of the Law of Trusts, 105 Yale LJ 625, 656 (1995).
48. "By contrast, for liability to arise from a breach of the requirements of prudent administration
or prudent investing, the trustee's lapse must be shown to have caused harm." Id.
49. One of Ned Warren's attorneys later acknowledged that Ned's case hinged on Sam's fiduciary
responsibilities under the law of trusts and that the lawsuit probably would not have been tenable if additional showings, such as that Sam had secretly obtained a personal advantage from the Trust, had been
required. See Hearings at 284 (cited in note 8) (testimony of Sherman Whipple: "I reached the conclusion
that there was a legal wrong; that here was a violation of that principle of law with regard to trusts which I
have just pointed out, but that there was no reprehensible motive to secure a personal advantage secretly or
in any way like that.).
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ImmuTABLE RULES, DEFAULT RULES AND CHOICE OF
ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
The Warren family thus sought the no-exit and governance features provided by the rule' of a dynastic trust, but sought to contract around strict fiduciary rules on trustees' conflicts of interest for something doser to the rules that
would in most jurisdictions govern dose corporations. The Warrens in essence
wanted to treat fiduciary duty rules as default rules even though the law of trusts
saw them as immutable. In order for the trustees to be one step removed from
the lessee, the property was leased by the Trust to Brandeis as a conduit and
then in turn to the Firm. The bargain was in form an arm's length transaction,
and technically it probably complied with the law. In reality-a reality of which
all of the Warren family members were aware-it was anything but an arm's
length transaction and was vulnerable to subsequent challenge by any of the
Trust beneficiaries.
The Warrens could theoretically have chosen an organizational form with
fiduciary duty rules more dosely resembling the arrangement that they wanted,
perhaps by putting the Mills Property in a dose corporation or similar entity.
Because dose corporation governance rules, however, link majority ownership
with control, the Warrens would have had to contract around these rules, for
example, by giving voting stock to the managers and nonvoting stock to the
passive investors. There were other problems with the corporate form as well. It
was still relatively new, particularly in Massachusetts, and capitalization requirements were stringent.5 0 Furthermore, the Mills Property was in Maine and the
selling operations in Boston, and at the time there was considerable uncertainty
about whether a corporation in one state could own real estate in another state
without risk that the property would escheat to the state.51 There was also considerable uncertainty over the powers of corporations to contract and the consequences of exceeding those powers.5 2 Furthermore, a corporation would have
50. Consider Public Statutes of Massachusetts chs 105-06 (1886) (setting forth legal requirements
for Massachusetts corporations). One of the more stringent requirements was that shares in a corporation
be paid for either in cash or with property the value of which had been attested to and approved by the
Commissioner of Corporations. Id at ch 106, § 48. For the purpose of carrying on a manufacturing business, the statute provided that the corporation had to have capital of not less than five thousand nor more
than one million dollars. Id at ch 106, § 7. Arguably, the value of the property in the Mills Trust exceeded
the allowed amount.
51. See generally Arthur M. Alger, Consequencer of Illegal or Ultra Vires Aqui'siion of Real Estate by a
Corporation,8 Harv L Rev 15, 16 (1894-95) (describing and criticizing "the view expressed, either directly or

inferentially, in the authorities in question, that corporate realty unlawfully acquired may be seized by the
State"); Arthur M. Alger, The Dochine of Pub Poliy asApplied to Owaersh~o of Real Estate by Foreign Corporalions, 9 Harv L Rev 91 (1895-96) (discussing state statutes that prohibit a foreign corporation from taking
or holding land within its borders and the prospect of judge-made law imposing a similar prohibition).
52. See generally George Wharton Pepper, The Unauthodd orProhibitedExerise of CorporatePowe, 9
Harv L Rev 255 (1895-96) (describing the ultra vires doctrine and its impact on the enforcement of con-
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had the disadvantage of being permanent, whereas the Trust would be dissolved
in thirty-three years. For whatever reason, Brandeis and Sam chose to start with
the form with which they and the family members were most familiar-the dynastic trust.
53
The dynastic trust was extraordinarily popular in Boston at the time. It
was, however, generally used by families having older fortunes than the Warrens
had. These families usually owned securities and other financial assets requiring
the supervision of a money manager rather than a business manager. Professional trustees, at first individuals and then institutions, thus sprung up in the
late nineteenth century to manage the wealth of Boston's mercantile aristocracy.54 The dynastic trust's separation of ownership from control was just what
these families wanted to safeguard fortunes from the whims of a single generation, and the dynastic trust's fiduciary rules were little trouble because there were
few occasions for a trustee legitimately to engage in self-dealing transactions
with a portfolio of financial assets. When used to hold business assets that
needed day-to-day management by a business manager, on the other hand, the
dynastic trust was an awkward vehicle. The trustee would have to hire a manager
willing to work under the supervision of the trustee. The conflict of interest
prohibition in the law of trusts was particularly troublesome if the trustee and
the manager were one and the same. On the other hand, it could be awkward to
separate control of the business from its management, in effect, to ask a salaried
manager to work under the supervision of a trustee and have no say in the most
important decisions affecting the business. Furthermore, the fiduciary norms of
the dynastic trust made it difficult to incentivize the manger (particularly if he
was also a trustee) by giving him a share of the business's profits.
The weak link in the Warren Trust arrangement was thus fiduciary duty
rules that could only be contracted around in form, not substance. Over one
hundred years after the Warren Trust was established, Professor John Langbein
argued in 1995 that fiduciary norms intrusts should be treated as default rules,
and pointed to specific cases in which "[c]onflicts of interest are sometimes embedded in the very relationship that induces the settlor to ask the particular individual to serve as trustee."55 "Using the hypothetical bargain analysis of contract,
the question is whether, had the settlor anticipated the opportunity to make the
trust better off by allowing the fiduciaries to become co-venturers in such a
situation, he would have authorized the step. '5 6 As Professor Langbein pointed
out, however, cases in which the settlor probably would have wanted to contract
tracts against a corporation and hence on the ability of a corporation to contract); Jesse W. Lilenthal, NonPublic Corporationsand Ultra Vires, 11 Harv L Rev 387 (1897-98) (describing legal consequences of a corporation exceeding the powers granted in its charter, including in some jurisdictions forfeiture of the charter).
53. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 Yale LJ 547, 554-55 (1965).
54. See id at 554.
55. Langbein, 105 Yale LJ at 665 (cited in note 47).
56. Id at 666.
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around fiduciary duty norms have still been decided against the trustee.57 Professor Langbein, in advocating an approach that would have upheld Brandeis's
arrangement against fiduciary duty claims, is even now ahead of his time.
Still, ex ante, the dynastic trust may have been the best available choice for
the Warren family, given the dynastic trust's desirable governance norms (dear
separation of the beneficiaries' ownership from the trustees' control) and restrictions on early exit. Sam Warren and Brandeis might not have worried about the
dynastic trust's inflexible fiduciary duty rules, probably because they believed no
family member would sue. Alternatively, they perhaps naively believed that a
court would understand that the Warren family had contracted around these
rules and would only hold Sam liable for unjust enrichment. Whatever the reason, the Warrens' choice of the dynastic trust, with its strict immutable fiduciary
standards, as the starting point for their organizational structure was to provide
Ned Warren with a loaded gun that years later he could aim at Sam.
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
What happened? In part the expected happened. When he was young,
Ned's interest in preserving the value of the principal in the Trust corresponded
with the interest of his siblings in doing the same, and indeed Ned urged early
on that "the mills must be kept up at all cost"' 58 This meant reinvesting money
into the business in order to increase its future earning potential. Ned, however,
was unlikely to have heirs (he actually did adopt a son in the last decade of his
life, but long after the dispute over the Warren Trust ended in 1910). As all five
siblings grew older (and Henry died in 1899, leaving his interest to the others),
Ned's interests started to diverge from the others and maximizing distributions
became for Ned an increasingly important concern.5 9
Also, Ned was the only one of the Warren siblings, besides Sam, who be-

57. Id at 665-67, citing In reRotbko, 372 NE2d 291 (NY 1977) (two of three executors whom Mark
Rothko selected to administer his estate held liable for conflict of interest in transaction selling Rothko
paintings to the Marlborough Gallery, even though Rothko had sold his paintings through the Marlborough Gallery throughout his lifetime and had selected these two executors knowing that they had strong
ties to the Gallery); Boardman v Phpps,[1967] 2 App Cas 46 (HL), afPg P ops v Boardman, [1965] Ch 992
(defendant trustee developed a plan to reorganize a dose corporation in which trust held one quarter of the
stock and when the trust declined to purchase additional shares purchased these shares himself; trustee
held liable to disgorge to the trust his profit on personally acquired shares, even though the reorganization
caused the value of the trust's shares to increase substantially).
58. Hearingsat 859 (cited in note 8) (testimony of Edward McClennen).
59. "Along in the latter part of the nineties the correspondence showed that Edward was getting
into the purchase of these antiquities and using a large amount of money in that way, and there began to
be-perhaps I ought not to say a large amount of money, because it is also comparative-but he was using
money in that way and feeling cramped to some extent in consequence of that, but no criticisms, as I recall
it, of the way the money was being expended in improving the plant. Of course, the improvement of the
plant was recognized by them all as being an investment of their funds in increasing their capital." Id
(testimony of Edward McClennen).
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lieved his intellectual and professional pursuits to be a business. Ned believed
that there was considerable money to be made in classical antiquities, and indeed
Edward McClennen acknowledged at Brandeis's confirmation hearings in 1916
that in this regard Ned's judgment was superior to that of Sam, who believed
Ned's purchases to be a waste of money.60 As Ned engaged more extensively in
the antiquities business and his schemes became grander, he convinced himself
that antiquities were really a better place to invest money than a paper mill run
by his older brother. He wanted access to his share of the principal in the Trust
61
as well as the income, and began to look for an exit from the Trust altogether.
Exit for a beneficiary from a dynastic trust not being easy, he began to look into
the only way out-suing for breach of trust by the trustees.
In part the unexpected happened. The 1890s were a very poor decade for
the American economy as a whole, and not particularly successful years for S.D.
Warren & Co. Declining profits for the Firm, coupled with Sam's decision to
invest in capital improvements, reduced the income available to the beneficiaries. 62 In 1897, Sam wrote to Ned and Cornelia, telling them that their income
from the trust would drop by 25 percent from $33,000 to $26,000, and that
things were unlikely to improve soon.63 According to Ned's attorneys, Sam also
responded to the financial pressure by spending money on repairs (which were
the responsibility of the Firm) and allocating it to capital improvements paid for
by the Trust.64 Curiously, the Firm did not take advantage of the opportunity it
had under the Lease to terminate and demand renegotiation of the rent. The
Firm's end of the bargain thus was sufficiently attractive, even in hard economic
times, for the Firm to continue. According to Ned's attorneys, the principals in
the Firm made more than $2,000,000 over twenty years (an average of $100,000
per year) for running the business, twice as much as what, in Ned's view, they
65
could fairly charge.

There may have been some opportunistic conduct on Sam's part (particularly if he improperly billed repairs to the Trust as improvements), but part of
the problem was a difference in priorities. Indeed it is likely that Sam, Sr., the
father of five children, would have preferred the reinvestment preferences of

Sam over the distribution preferences of Ned, and Sam, acting with the consent
60. Id at 872 (testimony of Edward McClennen).
61. Green, Mount Vernon Street Warrens at 197 (cited in note 9) (discussing Ned's desire to sell out
his interest in the Trust to someone like J.P. Morgan).

62. See id at 146.
63. Id.
64. Hearings at 278-79 (cited in note 8) (testimony of Moorfield Storey); id at 861-62 (testimony of

Edward McClennen).
65. Id at 139-40 (testimony of Hollis Bailey). Using the 1897 figures for the income to the Trust
beneficiaries, cited in Green, Mount Vernon Street Warrensat 146 (cited in note 9), $195,000 was paid out to
the trust beneficiaries on an annual basis ($26,000 being a two-fifteenths share of this total) compared with
the $100,000 the principals of the Firm earned on average each year for managing the business. Most of the

money earned by the Firm was split between Sam and Mortimer Mason.
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of the other trustees, dearly had the power to make decisions about such things
as tradeoffs between distribution and reinvestment. Nonetheless, Sam's near
absolute power as a trustee came with immutable fiduciary duty rules imposing a
very high standard on Sam and requiring judicial scrutiny of any transaction that
hinted at self-dealing. Because the arrangement inherently involved self-dealing
in substance, even if technicalities such as the lease of the Mills Property
through Brandeis as a conduit had made it legal, this meant that, if Ned took
Sam to court over the Firm's performance of the Lease terms, Sam was likely to
lose.
Ned retained a Boston lawyer, William Youngman, in 1906 to conduct a review of the Trust's and the Firm's accounts. On December 19, 1909, Youngman
and another Boston lawyer, Hollis Russell Bailey, brought a bill in equity on
behalf of Ned against Sam as trustee and against the estate of Mortimer Mason,
also as a trustee, alleging that they had from 1889 to 1909 disposed of the Trust
property in breach of their fiduciary duties as trustees. Louis Brandeis was not
named as a defendant and was not present in the courtroom (his law partner
Edward McClennen defended the suit on behalf of Sam). In 1910, Sam Warren
was examined at length before a master by Sherman Whipple, trial counsel for
Ned, but Sam shot himself before the examination was completed. The case was
settled shortly after Sam's death when the other family members bought out
66
Ned's interest in the Trust for over one million dollars.
I[. CLIENT CONFLICTS IN LEGAL REPRESENTATIONS

COMMON REPRESENTATION-AN EVOLVING STANDARD?
Rules governing client conflicts changed over the course of the twentieth
century and in particular became more detailed with each draft of the ABA's
standards. The trend from broad standards to more precise rules is evident from
comparing the 1908 ABA Canons with the 1969 Model Code, and again with
the 1983 Model Rules. The "appearance of impropriety" 67 standard used to define conflicts jurisprudence. 68 This standard, however, is gone in the Model
Rules and is only rarely mentioned by courts deciding conflicts cases. 69 The
66. See Green, Mount Vernon Street Warrens at 10-12 (cited in note 9) (describing Sam's suicide); id at
212 (discussing the settlement buying out Ned's interest in the Trust for $1,770,000). See also Hearing at
277-79 (cited in note 8) (testimony of Moorfield Storey describing the settlement with Ned).
67. See Model Code, Canon 9 ("A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety"). The Model Rules contain no similar provision.
68. See, for example, GeneralMotors vNew York, 501 F2d 639 (2d Cir 1974) (Kaufman J) (applying
the "appearance of impropriety" standard to disqualify a former government lawyer who substantially
participated in the bringing of an antitrust suit by the Justice Department from representing a private
plaintiff in a similar antitrust suit against the same defendant).
69. See Charles W. Wolfram, Former-ClientConflicts,
10 GeoJ Leg Ethics 677, 686 (1997) (discussing
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standard for defining a "conflicting interest" in Canon 670 was very ambiguous
and the "differing interests" standard in the Model Code was not much clearer. 71
An "adverse interest" under Model Rule 1.7 is not always easy to identify, but
the rule identifies adversity as the determinative criteria for a conflict and in the
72
comments gives some guidance as to what adversity means.
Still, the basic standards governing client conflicts have remained remarkably consistent over time. Although it could be argued that Brandeis was unfairly
criticized at his confirmation hearings for practicing law according to the standards of his day, this view does not square with the sophisticated understanding
of client conflicts displayed by both Brandeis's critics and his supporters in the
discussion of the Warren Trust matter. Indeed, the testimony by all of the witnesses reveals an understanding of basic conflicts rules that is remarkably similar
to the understanding we have today. Brandeis's representation of Samuel D.
Warren, Sr.'s executors, and indirectly the entire Warren family, in setting up the
Trust and his subsequent representation of the trustees, on the one hand, and
his representation of Sam and the other principals of the Firm, on the other, did
involve representing differing interests to some extent. Brandeis appeared, however, to have the consent of all of the Warrens to the common representation
(at least none of them objected to the representation), meaning the representation probably complied with ethics rules then and now. Then, as now, there is
deep ambivalence about common representations of this sort. As Moorfield
Storey pointed out to the Senate Judiciary Committee, "I think it is a common
73
practice, but, I think, a bad practice."
This so-called "bad practice" continues today. Whenever a group of investors, related to each other or not, approaches a lawyer to set up a close corpora-

the fortunate demise of the appearance of impropriety standard in conflicts jurisprudence); Model Rule 1.9,
cmt [31 (stating that although Canon 9 was formerly used to deal with motions to disqualify a lawyer because of conflicts, "since 'impropriety' is undefined, the term 'appearance of impropriety' is question begging'); Model Rule 1.9, cmt [6] (stating that "a rule based on a functional analysis is more appropriate for
determining the question of disqualification").
'
70. Canon 6 (1908) (a "conflicting interest exists "when, in behalf of one client, it is [the lawyer's]
duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose."). Canon 6 provided that
"[it is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts."
71. Model Code DR 5-105(A) (a lawyer "shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the
acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing differing
interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C)"); Model Code DR 5-105(C) (a lawyer may
represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each
consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the
exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each.').
72. See Model Rule 1.7, cmt [3] ("Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate against a person
the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if it is wholly unrelated. On the other hand, simultaneous
representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse, such as competing
economic enterprises, does not require consent of the respective clients.").
73. Hearingsat 279 (cited in note 8) (testimony of Moorfield Storey).
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tion or similar entity and the lawyer undertakes the representation, potential
conflicts emerge as soon as the investors allocate voting control, share repurchase options, and other rights within the entity. The lawyer sometimes technically avoids the conflict by undertaking to represent the entity itself rather than
the individuals, but there is no avoiding the fact that articles of organization
drafted by the lawyer can favor one of the individual investors over another.
Sometimes, the investors obtain separate counsel, but often they do not. Advantages of the common representation include lower legal fees, lower "attitudinal
negotiation costs" for the transaction, and more attention being given to strategies that increase total value rather than to how value will be distributed in
unlikely contingencies. Less emphasis on legal protection for individual investors also may encourage the parties to devise non-legal mechanisms for assuring
good faith performance by their counterparts. For one or more of these or other
reasons, the advantages of common representation often outweigh the disadvantages; in other words, investors, particularly those from within the same family,
still view this "bad practice" as preferable to each hiring his or her own lawyer.
Even after a dispute arises within an entity set up by a lawyer for a group of
individuals, there are circumstances where the lawyer may continue to represent
some of the parties against the others. Clearly, the lawyer cannot do so if the
lawyer previously represented all of the clients individually. If, however, the lawyer undertook to represent the entity itself-whether a corporation, LLC, or
similar entity, including a trust-the lawyer may continue to take instructions
from its directors, trustees, or other persons having legal control over it. As a
practical matter, the lawyer representing the entity may represent the control
persons against the minority who are challenging their authority.
BRANDEIS'S PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT IN THE WARREN TRUST
MATTER
The first issue raised by Hollis Bailey in his testimony against Brandeis before the Senate Judiciary Committee was whether Brandeis should have represented both the Trust and the Firm at the same time.74 This was the "bad practice" acknowledged by Moorfield Storey also to be a "common practice."75 The
propriety of the common representation in this instance depended on two issues: whether the two clients, the Trust and the Firm, gave informed consent to
the arrangement and whether Brandeis could have adequately represented them
both under the circumstances. 76 Informed consent on the part of the Trust arguably meant informed consent from each of its beneficiaries. The better argument, however, is that what was required was the informed consent of the
74. See id at 138-59 (testimony of Hollis Bailey).
75. Id at 279 (testimony of Moorfield Storey).
76. This standard is set forth today in Model Rule 1.7(a).
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Trust's trustees, who were also the executors under Samuel D. Warren, Sr.'s will.
Because two of these trustees--Sam and Mortimer Mason-were on the other
side of the transaction as principals of the Firm, the person whose consent was
most important was the third trustee, Sam's mother Mrs. Warren, who was also
the beneficiary of five fifteenths of the property in the Trust. Unfortunately,
very little is known about what Mrs. Warren knew about the Lease. Mrs. Warren, however, was an intelligent and strong-willed person 77 and probably would
not have allowed a financial arrangement to which she had not consented. What
she knew about Brandeis's legal work for the family is less clear, but there is no
evidence that she ever objected to Brandeis's representation of the Trust and the
Firm at the same time.
Furthermore, Brandeis probably adequately represented both the Firm and
the Trust. Brandeis's principal role was to handle the legal technicalities of the
arrangement (particularly structuring the Lease so it would be valid under the
law of trusts and so the beneficiaries would be protected from the liability of
partners). 78 Most of the substantive issues in the Lease were business issues that
should have been understandable to the beneficiaries when they conveyed their
interests in the Mills Property to the Trust knowing that the Lease would soon
follow. 79 Mrs. Warren, the only nonconflicted Trustee, must have understood
the essential feature of the deal-that Sam, Mortimer Mason, and to a lesser
extent Fiske would be compensated through the Firm for managing the business. The other beneficiaries appear to have understood this as well. 80 Although
there were business terms in the Lease the significance of which the beneficiaries may not all have understood (particularly concerning allocation of responsibility for repairs and improvements to the Mills Property), the overriding legal

77. See Green, Mount Vernon Street Warrens at 59-60 (cited in note 9).
78. Brandeis also furnished a legal opinion to the effect that the Lease accomplished the Warrens'
desired objectives. See Hearings at 141 (cited in note 8) (testimony of Hollis Bailey stating that Brandeis
"wrote an opinion, which was sent to the different beneficiaries, saying that the plan was one that was
legally correct and proper, that by means of the trust the beneficiaries would be protected from individual
liability as partners, and that it was a proper arrangement.").
79. There was some dispute about how much the various beneficiaries knew about the Lease at the
time it was entered into. Ned in particular was bound to know less than the others because he was living in
Europe at the time. According to Hollis Bailey, Ned did not see the Lease itself but did know that the
trustees were empowered to run the business themselves or to lease the Mills Property. See id (testimony of
Hollis Bailey that "[m]y client, Mr. Edward Warren, was not shown a copy of the lease, or the lease itself.
He did sign a deed conveying the property to the trustees, but he did not see a copy of the deed of trust
which provided that the trustees should either carry on the paper business or make a lease on suitable
terms to someone else. He learned of the lease and what had taken place some time after 1903, when he
employed independent counsel, Mr. Youngman'). But see id at 278 (testimony of Moorfield Storey stating
that the arrangement "was submitted to [Ned Warren] and agreed to by him, and I saw nothing in the
arrangement as to which he could complain.'); id at 858 (testimony of Edward McClennen referring to a
November 9, 1889, letter from Sam to Ned "in which reference is made to the fact that the rate of rent is 6
percent and the interest in the profits.').
80. See note 34 above (quoting correspondence between Sam and Henry at the time the Trust was
established).
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issue was the very high fiduciary duties that would be imposed on any selfdealing by the trustees.
Hollis Bailey and William Youngman claimed at the 1916 confirmation
hearing that Brandeis used the Lease to help Sam cheat his siblings,81 but Sam
was the person exposed to the highest legal risk from the transaction the way it
was structured. It is also unlikely that Sam's alleged opportunistic conduct would
have been prevented by separate representation of the Trust at the outset as
opposed to more careful monitoring by the beneficiaries of the trustees' compliance with their fiduciary duties during the lifetime of the Trust. 2 It was the Warrens' deference to Sam and then Ned's sudden interest in the Trust's affairs beginning around 1906 that contributed most to the dispute that ensued.
This does not mean that Ned would not have been better off having independent counsel to advise him.8 3 On exit and governance issues, Ned probably
had different preferences than the other beneficiaries and should have been
encouraged to avoid a Trust under which his inheritance would be controlled
for thirty-three years by an older brother with whom he had a very troublesome
relationship. Still, however, Ned must have understood that he had no exit or
governance rights in the Trust, and, perhaps because he was preoccupied with
living in England at the time, he did not object. With respect to distributions
from the Trust, Ned's interests were mostly aligned with the interests of the

other beneficiaries not associated with the Firm: Henry, Cornelia, and Mrs. Warren.84 Separate counsel for each of them would have been superfluous, although

perhaps they should have jointly hired a separate lawyer or financial advisor,
81. Hearingsat 473 (cited in note 8) (testimony of Hollis Bailey and William Youngman, counsel to
Ned in his 1910 lawsuit and opponent of Brandeis's nomination; the latter stating that Sam had to be
persuaded by Brandeis to put this plan into effect: "Mr. Brandeis had convinced [Sam] that the plan, or the
scheme, as he called it, was a proper one."). Despite Bailey and Youngman's willingness to vilify
Brandeis
in the Warren Trust matter at his confirmation hearings, claims against Brandeis were not included in
Ned's 1910 lawsuit, and Bailey admitted in his 1916 testimony that the facts underlying his accusation
against Brandeis had not been testified to before. Id at 138 (testimony of Hollis Bailey).
82. Probably the most significant contribution that separate counsel for the Trust might have made
would have been designing a mechanism for monitoring the Firm's performance under the terms of the
Lease other than reliance on the supervisory powers of the trustees. For example, it could have been agreed
at the outset that an independent financial advisor would determine what expenditures were repairs as
opposed to improvements. Substantial delegation of supervisory powers to third parties, however, would
have departed from the gnvernance rules for a dynastic trust, which vest almost complete discretionary
authority in trustees.
83. See Hedngs at 278 (cited in note 8)(testimony of Moorfield Storey. "It probably, in view of
what happened afterwards, would have been better if Mr. Edward Warren had independent advisers to
counsel him.").
84. Even Fiske's interests, given his relatively small interest in the Firm, did not deviate substantially from those of the others. See id at 278 (testimony of Moorfield Storey- "They were all of age, and
Fiske Warren, up to that time, had not been very active as a business man, any more than Edward Warren,
but he was on the ground and was in a position to employ counsel. Mr. Edward Warren was on the other
side of the water. At the time, as I say, there was nothing in the relations between the different members of
the family to suggest that there was any divergence of interests, or any reason why they should not act
harmoniously, as they did.").
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particularly if they favored a more liberal distribution policy than a majority of
the trustees were willing to allow. Ned, if he favored an even more liberal distribution policy than his mother or siblings, perhaps should have hired an advisor
of his own. Brandeis, however, undertook to represent the Trust and its trustees,
not Ned or any of the beneficiaries individually, 85 making separate counsel for
each of the beneficiaries, or lack thereof, peripheral to Brandeis's role in the
matter.
A second conflicts issue was raised when Brandeis's law partner, Edward
McClennen, represented Sam in the 1910 trial of Ned's suit while Brandeis was
in Washington, D.C., attending to the Congressional investigation of corruption
charges against Interior Secretary Ballinger.8 6 The issue was whether Brandeis
should have allowed McClennen to represent Sam after Brandeis had represented the Trust in the same matter. In essence, the charge was that Brandeis
was conflicted out of defending Sam against Ned's lawsuit because he had represented the Trust-and thus indirectly Ned-in the same matter and by imputed disqualification McClennen was disqualified as well.87 Nobody apparently
sought to disqualify McClennen at trial in 1910 (perhaps explaining why neither
Bailey nor Youngman chose to focus on this allegation in their testimony at the
hearings), but this did not stop several senators from engaging McClennen in a
88
lengthy discussion of successive conflicts rules.
McClennen's response to this allegation was that Brandeis had set up the
Trust and had represented the Trust and its trustees, not Ned Warren or any of
the other beneficiaries individually, 89 and that he was therefore right to defend
the trustees when the conduct of the Trust was challenged. 90 In essence,
85. Brandeis apparently did draft a will for Ned, but this was an unrelated matter. See id at 141 (testimony of Hollis Bailey discussing Brandeis's having drawn wills for both Mrs. Warren and Ned).
86. "Ballinger, [President] Taft's Secretary of the Interior, had fired a subordinate, Richard Glavis,
for impugning his integrity before the President by reporting suspicions about Ballinger's dealings with the
Guggenheim mining interests. Glavis had previously been in touch with the administration's chief forester,
Gifford Pinchot, the leading progressive spokesman on conservation issues, and by this time an ardent
opponent of Ballinger's policies. The two went to Collier's Weekly, which in turn published their story of
frustration. Collier's Weekly, Nov. 13, 1909, at 15-17, 27. The administration called for a Congressional
investigation to vindicate Ballinger, and also threatened to sue Collier's for libel. Brandeis, among other
leading lawyers, was called in by Collier's, to represent Glavis. The Republicans on the committee sought to
whitewash the matter and frustrated the lawyer at most turns. But Brandeis, smelling blood, sought the
wounds. Soon, by his questioning and 'detective-work,' he discovered that Taft had exonerated Ballinger
without being aware of all the facts and then, along with his attorney general, Wickersham, had antedated
certain documents to conceal his neglect." L.S. Zacharias, Repaving the Brandeis Way: The Decline of DevelopmentalProperty, 82 Nw U L Rev 596, 610 n 61 (1988). The Ballinger affair was to be one of many reasons
for the strong political opposition to Brandeis's nomination to the Supreme Court.
87. Today, this issue would be governed by Model Rule 1.9 (former client conflicts) and Model Rule
1.10 (imputed disqualification).
88. Hearingsat 874 (cited in note 8).
89. Id at 874 (testimony of Edward McClennen: "Well, I never had thought of that problem before.
Of course, the only way in which in these matters Mr. Brandeis had ever represented Ned Warren at all was
derivatively; that is, he had been counsel for these trustees and counsel for S.D. Warren & Co.').
90. SENATOR WORKS. Did it ever occur to your mind that there might be any reason why
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McClennen and Brandeis were in a position no different from a lawyer today
who sets up a dose corporation and then represents the corporation and its
directors when the conduct of the directors is challenged by a minority shareholder.
Another criticism of Brandeis, implicit in the testimony if not explicitly
stated, centered around his effort to contract around immutable rules governing
dynastic trusts by elevating form over substance. Brandeis, acting as a conduit,
took a lease on the Mills Property from the Trust and then leased it to the Firm
in order to get around the prohibition on trustees' self-dealing that would otherwise have voided the Lease transaction. Although this device might have appeared devious, Brandeis was doing what good business lawyers do-he chose
an organizational structure that accomplished some of the Warren family's objectives (preventing easy exit and reserving control of the business for Sam and
Mortimer Mason) and then devised a solution to a problem that this organizational structure handled poorly (the need to compensate and incentivize Sam,
who was giving up the practice of law, Mortimer Mason, and to a lesser extent
Fiske for running the business). Without this arrangement, the Warren family
probably would have had to sell the Mills Property.
Whether or not the objective of keeping the business in the family was a
wise one, Brandeis properly left this for the Warrens to decide. 91 Furthermore,
all of the Warrens, particularly Sam, probably knew that they had not contracted
out of substantive fiduciary law for trusts; if the trustees' conduct was ever challenged, strict fiduciary standards would be used to evaluate any self-interested
conduct involved. Thus, Brandeis did not contract around, and probably did not
even try to contract around, liability for breach of the high fiduciary standards in
the law of trusts. If anybody was left with fewer legal rights in the arrangement
than he might have expected, it was Sam, not Ned or the other beneficiaries.
The arrangement's attractiveness to Sam rested upon the assumption that
nobody in the Warren family would sue the trustees and that the immutable
fiduciary duty rules for trusts thus would never be litigated. 92 This assumption
was probably a good one in 1889, as the Warrens had much to lose in family
Mr. Brandeis should not represent one of these parties as against the other, considering the fact
that it grew out of the trust transaction in which he was attorney, and the instrument that he

drew?
MR. McCLENNEN. I had not thought and never had heard it suggested until today that that
was one of the factors of possible criticism. It was a matter of absolute course as handled at the
time that we should defend this trustee whose trust administration was being attacked.
Id.
91. See Model Rule 1.2 (providing that a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning overall
objectives of a representation).
92. See Heangs at 279 (cited in note 8) (testimony of Moorfield Storey: "Of course, wherever the
same person is interested on both sides to a contract, complications may arise, but where, as in that case,
the parties were brothers and sister and mother, etc., there was no disposition, I am sure, on the part of
anyone to take advantage of anybody else.").
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reputation and otherwise by taking each other to court and much to gain by
working out their differences privately. Of course, things did not work out that
way, as relations between Ned and Sam steadily worsened and Ned, as reluctant
as he was to sue, finally did sue in 1910.93 Condemning the 1889 arrangement
and Brandeis as its architect because things did not work out as expected, how94
ever, would be blatant hindsight bias.
CONCLUSION
The Warren Trust is an example of how hindsight bias and ethnic bias 95 affected the Brandeis confirmation hearings. The Trust and Lease arrangement
designed by Brandeis for the Warrens was presumed to be flawed because, otherwise, a family of such stature in Boston's Protestant merchant community
96
would never have embroiled itself in the litigation that followed.
93. A 1910 letter from Ned to Sam confirmed that Ned, as much as he disliked his brother, was
very reluctant to file the bill in equity. See id at 860 (testimony of Edward McClennen: "This is a letter
which was received by Mr. Sam Warren on December 14, 1909, and reads as follows: 'My Dear Sam: I have
had to file the bill because otherwise it would have been difficult to obtain a satisfactory before Monday
next, but-First. I hope that you will make me contented to withdraw it; and Second. The phrases are such
as in a legal document I have felt obliged to sign, but are very far from representing my feelings toward you
aside from the business of my desire for unanimous fraternal procedure. Let us try to agree; it would be
much pleasanter. Your affectionate brother, E.P. Warren, Bellevue Hotel, Boston, December 13, 1909."').
94. Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski and others point out that decision makers are likely to overstate the
predictability of past events. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psyehological
Tbeoy ofJudging in Hindsight, 65
U Chi L Rev 571, 571 (1998). See also Kim A. Kamin and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, ExPost # Ex Ante, Determining Liabilily in Hindsight,19 Law & Hum Behavior 89 (1995). This so-called "hindsight bias" can affect how
legal rules are applied by decision makers who assess whether an actor's conduct met a standard such as
reasonableness. Rachlinski concludes that adjustments to the litigation system for hindsight bias are generally not necessary. Rachlinski, 65 U Chi L Rev at 624-25. However, with respect to judging other people's
ethics, whether in an attorney disciplinary proceeding or in a setting such as a confirmation hearing, there
may be more cause to worry.
95. Ethnic bias in the Brandeis confirmation hearings was an obvious if not openly talked about issue. So much has been written on how anti-Semitism affected Brandeis's life that there is little to add here,
except to observe that it is easier to generate publicity for an accusation against a person that fits stereotypes of his or her ethnic group than of conduct that does not. Sharp practices on behalf of moneyed
clients have for a long time plagued the bar, yet allegations of such conduct only this one time in the twentieth century became the centerpiece of a case against a Supreme Court nominee. (The Warren Trust episode was relitigated before the Senate Judiciary Committee against the wishes of the Warren family after it
was leaked to a Boston newspaper hostile to Brandeis, probably by the Warren family's own lawyers.) More
recentiy, unwelcome sexual advances, long a problem at the bench and bar (and in the United States Senate
for that matter), were first raised as an issue in the confirmation hearing of the second African American
nominated to the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas. The fact that these two Justices (both also highly controversial in their political views) were accused of conduct so easily fitting into stereotypes may be a coincidence. If not, something more troublesome is going on that requires reexamination of the ethics of the
confirmation process itself.
96. Even George W. Anderson, counsel appointed by the Judiciary Committee to present evidence
in favor of Brandeis, solicited testimony as to the high standing of the Warrens. See Hearings at 284 (cited
in note 8):
MR. ANDERSON. Mr. Samuel D. Warren and his father both belonged to the class of men
eminent in business and well-known for their personal integrity?
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There was one glaring omission from the entire discussion of the Warren
Trust matter at the heaings-a frank acknowledgment of how deeply troubled
the Warren family really was. William Youngman was ridiculed by several senators for going too far and claiming that Sam Warren was somehow duped
("chloroformed") into cheating his siblings by a devious Brandeis. 97 Nonetheless, nobody, not even Brandeis's staunch defenders, brought up the deep divisions within the Warren family that caused this tragedy to happen or even mentioned to the Committee that Sam had killed himself. Nobody questioned the
Warrens' capacity to operate their business or to be civic leaders of Boston and
of the nation.98 Attacking Brandeis's character was fair game, but there was not
even a cursory look at how conflicting ambitions in the Warren family led to its
destruction. Ned's inability to get the respect he believed Sam owed him and the
reasons for their conflict (particularly its sexual overtones) were not discussed.
Brandeis may have used imperfect judgment-at least in hindsight-in his
design of the Trust and in his representation of the Warrens (arguably he selected an inappropriate organizational form in the dynastic trust and should have
taken more care to explain the potential conflicts to the trustees before they
consented to his concurrent representation of the Firm). Still, the facts show
that the Warren family itself, not the legal forms drafted by Brandeis, was responsible for the tragedy that ensued. Sometimes it is indeed the client, and not
the lawyer, who is to blame.

MR. WHIPPLE. That is true.
MR. ANDERSON. Men against whose character and reputation no breath had ever arisen?
MR. WHIPPLE. I can not say as to that, because I was not familiar enough with social or busi-

ness life prior to this time to make a statement; but I have always understood that the elder
Warren was an honorable merchant of very high standing, and certainly Mr. Samuel Warren
stood very well in the community-stood very high in the community.
97. Id at 501-02 (testimony of William Youngman).
98. Sam Warren, Sr., had testified before the Senate Labor Committee in 1883 about his successful
labor relations. Green, Mount Vernon Street Warrens at 34 (cited in note 9).

